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Abstract
Background: Antiretroviral medicines (ARVs) are one of the most costly parts of HIV/AIDS
treatment. Many countries are struggling to provide universal access to ARVs for all people living
with HIV and AIDS. Although substantial price reductions of ARVs have occurred, especially
between 2002 and 2008, achieving sustainable access for the next several decades remains a major
challenge for most low- and middle-income countries. The objectives of the present study were
twofold: first, to analyze global ARV prices between 2005 and 2008 and associated factors,
particularly procurement methods and key donor policies on ARV procurement efficiency; second,
to discuss the options of procurement processes and policies that should be considered when
implementing or reforming access to ARV programs.
Methods: An ARV-medicines price-analysis was carried out using the Global Price Reporting
Mechanism from the World Health Organization. For a selection of 12 ARVs, global median prices
and price variation were calculated. Linear regression models for each ARV were used to identify
factors that were associated with lower procurement prices. Logistic regression models were used
to identify the characteristics of those countries which procure below the highest and lowest direct
manufactured costs.
Results: Three key factors appear to have an influence on a country's ARV prices: (a) whether the
product is generic or not; (b) the socioeconomic status of the country; (c) whether the country is
a member of the Clinton HIV/AIDS Initiative. Factors which did not influence procurement below
the highest direct manufactured costs were HIV prevalence, procurement volume, whether the
country belongs to the least developed countries or a focus country of the United States
President's Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief.
Conclusion: One of the principal mechanisms that can help to lower prices for ARV over the next
several decades is increasing procurement efficiency. Benchmarking prices could be one useful tool
to achieve this.
Introduction
Why do antiretroviral medicines (ARV) prices matter?
Since the mid 1990s, highly active antiretroviral treatment
(HAART) has become the standard recommended treat-
ment, including a combination of at least three antiretro-
viral medicines. Between 2002 and late 2007, the number
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of patients receiving antiretroviral treatment (ART) world-
wide grew from around 300,000 to approximately 3 mil-
lion people [1].
However, there remains a large gap between those in need
of receiving HAART and those who receive it. According to
estimates, out of the 33.5 million people living with HIV/
AIDS, 10 million need HAART, which leaves 7 million
people living with HIV and AIDS (PLWHA) currently
untreated. This is particularly problematic in Sub-Saharan
Africa, where two-thirds of all PLWHAs are residing [2].
Furthermore, it is estimated that 13.7 million people in
2010 and 21.9 million people in 2015 will need ART [2].
Affordability remains a critical issue, despite the fact that
between 2000 and 2007, the median price for first-line
combination therapy in developing countries fell from
US$10,000 to about US$90 per patient per year [3]. But
even US$90 remains unaffordable for many low-income
countries to spend on care for PLWHA, even when consid-
ering the growing availability of donor funds. In addition,
an increasing number of PLWHA require second-line
treatment because of resistance to first-line drug treatment
or an inability to tolerate first-line drugs. As a result, many
low- and middle-income countries are struggling to pro-
vide sustainable access to HAART.
In 2007, the WHO reported that the median price for the
most frequently used second-line HAART (abacavir +
didanosine + lopinavir/ritonavir) for low-income coun-
tries was US$1,214, 13.5 times higher than for first-line
treatment. In middle-income countries, the price for sec-
ond line therapy was 36.3 times higher than for first line
therapy (US$3,306 for second-line therapy, as compared
to US$91 for first-line therapy) [4]. Similarly, Médecins
sans Frontières (MSF) reported that, according to manu-
facturer price information, a change from the cheapest
first-line regime quoted with US$87 to the cheapest sec-
ond line with $US749 (tenofovir + emtricitabine + lopina-
vir/ritonavir) will at least increase expenditure nine-fold
[3]. As PLWHA on HAART live longer, an increasing
number will require second- and third-line therapies. The
durability of first-line therapy greatly varies between
regions; overall, it has been estimated that 22% of patients
switch after a mean time of 20 months to a second-line
combination [5]. An analysis of factors influencing ARV
prices is very relevant to increase long-term efficiency
(best value for money) in the provision of HAART. This
would allow designing appropriate policies to fuel the
production of low price ARVs or to implement the most
effective procurement processes.
One world, one price?
A first hypothesis that could be tested is that antiretroviral
prices do not differ significantly across countries. In fact,
some pharmaceutical companies, such as Pfizer, have
introduced new medications (e.g. maraviroc) at one glo-
bal price, without any tiered pricing or discounts provided
to poorer or countries with higher prevalence [3]. Such an
approach has numerous advantages, including eliminat-
ing the risk for arbitrage (purchasing medications in a low
price country and reselling them in a higher priced coun-
try) [6] and limiting objections from some countries
about why they are paying more than others. It may also
be argued that having one global price is more equitable
since every country pays the same price (although alterna-
tively it may be argued that such a pricing policy is ineq-
uitable because it does not recognize the lower ability of
poorer countries to pay).
The pricing data on ARVs, however, overwhelmingly dis-
proves the hypothesis that prices do not vary from country
to country. For example, the average price per patient per
year paid for by lower income countries for lopinavir/
ritonavir 133/33 mg is US$500, whereas the price for the
same product in middle-income countries is US$1134 [4].
Pharmaceutical companies have tried, in some cases, to
rationalize these price differences by establishing tiered
pricing based on socioeconomic status and/or other fac-
tors (Merck, 2008) [7]. Even with these attempts, how-
ever, countries have nevertheless been able to negotiate
significant discounts on ARVs which are not available to
other neighboring countries [3].
Other than the socioeconomic status of a country, the fac-
tors potentially responsible for the observed differences in
prices are numerous, including the prevalence of HIV, the
volume, the role of third party negotiators such as the
Clinton HIV/AIDS Initiative [8] or the United States Pres-
ident's Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) [9], and
access to generics. Vasan et al [10] found that differential
prices are inconsistently applied, particularly among
lower middle-income countries which are charged higher
prices. Similarly to Vasan et al [10], Chien [11] used the
Global Price Reporting Mechanism (GPRM) database to
analyze both volume and ARV prices in sub-Saharan
Africa, concluding that, despite differential pricing,
generic drugs were still being purchased at significantly
lower prices than innovator products.
The objectives of the present study were twofold: first, to
analyze global ARV prices between 2005 and 2008 and
associated factors, particularly procurement methods and
key donor policies on ARV procurement efficiency; and,
second, to discuss the options of procurement processes
and policies that should be considered when implement-
ing or reforming access to ARV programs. Given the lim-
ited analysis of the impact of procurement methods and
policies on procurement prices, the present study could
provide important policy recommendations for individ-BMC Public Health 2009, 9(Suppl 1):S6 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/S1/S6
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ual countries and also for donor organizations. Should all
countries or HIV/AIDS programs be recommended to use
a third party negotiation strategy to achieve lower prices?
Should countries or HIV and AIDS programs always
choose generic ARV over innovator products if patent pol-
icies allow doing so? Does bulk procurement result in
lower prices? 
Methods and data sources
In order to analyze factors influencing global ARV prices,
the Global Price Reporting Mechanism (GPRM) was ana-
lyzed. While other sources use price quotes from manu-
facturers [3], the strength of the GPRM is that it provides
information on the ARV prices that countries actually paid
(note: not end users of the drugs). The majority of the
information is transactional data for ARV procurements
made with donor funds from the Global Fund for AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM). Other data come
from the country offices that report procurement prices to
the World Health Organization (WHO), as well as inter-
national organization and procurement agencies, such as
Mission Pharm, United Nations Children's Fund
(UNICEF), International Dispensary Association Founda-
tion (IDA). These prices are all posted by the WHO on
their publicly accessible database http://www.who.int/
hiv/amds/price/hdd/. For this study, information was
downloaded in March 2009. We used procurement data
from January 2005 to December 2008, reported for twelve
of the most frequently used adult ARV medicines in first-
line and second-line therapy regimes in developing coun-
tries: efavirenz 600 mg, lamivudine 150 mg, lamivudine
150 mg/zidovudine 300 mg, nevirapine 200 mg, stadivu-
dine 40 mg and zidovudine 300 mg as first-line therapy;
and abacavir 300 mg, didanosine 100 mg and 400 mg,
lopinavir/ritonavir 133/33 mg, ritonavir 100 mg and ten-
ofovir 300 mg as second-line therapy. (We used the WHO
classification of first- and second-line therapy [4]).
A total of 11,276 transactions were available for an analy-
sis the 12 chosen ARVs (minimum of 332 transactions for
ritonavir to 1,732 for nevirapine) (Additional file 1, Table
1). In total, 92 countries reported data to the GPRM, 48 of
them classified as low-income countries, the rest lower-
middle, upper-middle and very few high-income coun-
tries. Out of all transactions, 84.6% were made by coun-
tries which participated in the Clinton HIV/AIDS
Initiative (CHAI) in 2008 and 40% of purchases were
made by PEPFAR focus countries. All prices in the present
study are reported in US dollars, unadjusted for inflation.
This is to allow comparison with other international liter-
ature on drug prices that also use prices unadjusted for
inflation [3,4]. In some cases, very high prices were cor-
rected when it was obvious that this was due to a record-
ing error; for instance, when instead of unit price the
package price was reported (a multiplication of the
number of units per package by unit price). Also dona-
tions were eliminated (purchases reported with a price of
US$0).
First, for each of the ARV and year of study, the median
price per patient per year was calculated. Since prices were
not normally distributed, the prices at the 25th and 75th
percentiles of the sample are also reported.
In order to identify the principal factors influencing prices
of each ARV, linear regression models were used choosing
the following independent variables based on their theo-
retical importance on price: HIV country prevalence
(<2%, 2-5%, >5%) [1], volume (in terciles), national
income per capita using the World Bank classification
(low-income, lower-middle-income, upper-middle-
income) [12], AIDS Program Effort Index (API) [13],
whether the product procured was innovator or generic
product (determined by the database entry of the manu-
facturer which sold the ARV), whether the country is
member of CHAI and whether the country is one of the 15
focus countries for the United States President's Emer-
gency Plan For AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) [14]. (PEPFAR oper-
ates in 114 different countries, but only 15 countries are
identifies as "focus countries".) High-income countries
were excluded from the regression models since it is likely
that the factors influencing prices in those countries are
different than in other income groups. In addition, the
number of procurements reported was very small. 
Prices were transformed in the logarithm as they were not
normally distributed and clustered by year (for instance,
all purchases of tenofovir were clustered by the year in
which they were purchased). To benchmark prices for
each ARV separately, the lowest direct manufactured cost
per patient per year (LDMC) and highest direct manufac-
tured cost per patient per year (HDMC) for 2007 was
obtained. The information on the LDMC and the HDMC
was obtained from Pinheiro et al [15] using the lowest
and highest active pharmaceutical ingredient (API) prices
reported by the WHO and the direct and indirect produc-
tion costs from Brazil's public production facilities. To
identify the characteristics of those countries that pur-
chased ARVs in 2007 at the LDMC and HDMC per patient
per year, two logarithmic regression models were used:
one model where the dependent variable was a procure-
ment price higher than the LDMC per patient per year and
the other model where the dependent variable was a pro-
curement price higher than the HDMC per patient per
year. Independent variables were the same as used in the
linear models above. ARVs were clustered by year and by
type.BMC Public Health 2009, 9(Suppl 1):S6 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/S1/S6
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Results
The majority of procurement price entries into the GPRM
database are made by low-income countries. Exceptions
are procurement reports of lopinavir/ritonavir and ritona-
vir where less than 40% of the reporting countries are low-
income (Additional file 1, Tables 1 and 2).
For each ARV, countries were mainly purchasing generic
products for first-line ARVs. For second-line ARVs, this
was only between 8 and 66% of purchases. For first-line
ARV, prices dropped between 81% and 123% in the last
four years, with the exception of zidovudine (-40%) and
stadivudine (0%) (Additional file 1, Table 1). Price reduc-
tions for second-line ARVs was considerably smaller,
between 0% and 61%, with the exception of abacavir,
which dropped by 165%. Didanosine 400 mg and ritona-
vir 100 mg prices were constant during the study period.
Variables associated with price
The results of the regression model show that, generally
speaking, the strongest predictor of price is whether the
ARV is purchased as innovator or generic (Tables 1 and 2).
Except lopinavir/ritonavir, the innovator is more expen-
sive than the generic product, despite price reductions for
many originator ARVs. Another relevant predictor of price
of first-line ARV was a country's socioeconomic status; for
lamivudine, lamivudine/zidovudine, nevirapine, stadivu-
dine and zidovudine, upper-middle-income countries
were paying statistically significant higher prices. Regard-
ing HIV prevalence, for three second-line ARVs, the higher
the countries' HIV prevalence, the lower the price. For
other second-line and first-line ARVs, prevalence was not
significantly associated, except nevirapine, for which
countries with higher prevalence paid more.
Contrary to the commonly held assumption that coun-
tries procuring large volumes have lower prices, the data
of the GPRM do not support this. Only in two out of 12
regression models, was larger volume associated with
lower price (nevirapine and lopinavir/ritonavir).
Whether the country is a member of CHAI was statistically
significantly associated with lower prices for three second-
line drugs (abacavir, didanosine 400 mg, ritonavir) and
one first-line ARV (lamivudine). In regards to the impor-
tance of being a PEPFAR priority country, the data indicate
Table 1: Factors associated with first-line ARV prices
Antiretroviral drugs+ EFV
600 mg
3TC150 mg/ZDV 300 
mg
3TC
150 mg
NVP
200 mg
d4T
40 mg
ZDC
300 mg
HIV prevalence 2-5% -0.079
(-0.247, 0.089)
0.056
(-0.123, 0.236)
0.081
(-0.166, 0.328)
0.126
(-0.003, 0.256)
0.156
(-0.346, 0.035)
-0.014
(-0.179, 0.152)
HIV prevalence >5% -0.120
(-0.301, 0.061)
0.140
(-0.026, 0.307)
0.143
(-0.211, 0.497)
0.100*
(0.006, 0.194)
0.230
(-0.686, 0.226)
-0.008
(-0.056, 0.041)
Lower-middle income 0.035
(-0.088, 0.158)
0.114
(-0.088, 0.316)
0.053
(-0.242, 0.348)
0.200
(-0.208, 0.609)
0.356
(-0.277, 0.989)
0.027
(-0.212, 0.266)
Upper-middle income 0.027
(-0.180, 0.233)
0.356**
(0.295, 0.416)
0.308*
(0.160, 0.456)
0.390**
(-0.295, 0.485)
0.483*
(0.146, 0.820)
0.190*
(0.018, 0.363)
Volume 2ndtercile -0.039
(-0.264, 0.186)
-0.040
(-0.144, 0.063)
-0.041
(0.217, 0.134)
-0.149*
(-0.296, -0.002)
0.120
(-0.280, 0.039)
-0.033
(-0.152 -0.085)
Volume 3thtercile -0.136
(-0.407, 0.135)
-0.034
(-0.196, 0.128)
-0.045
(-0.271, 0.181)
-0.271*
(-0.523, -0.020)
-0.143
(0.400, 0.113)
-0.073
(-0.226, 0.079)
API*** -0.002
(-0.015, 0.012)
-0.007*
(-0.015, 0.000)
-0.013**
(-0.019, -0.006)
-0.003
(-0.007, 0.001)
-0.001
(-0.013, 0.011)
0.001
(-0.011, 0.013)
Innovator 0.568**
(0.299, 0.837)
0.736**
(0.409, 1.063)
0.452*
(-0.094, 0.810)
1.730**
(1.366, 2.093)
1.000*
(0.372, 1.629)
0.458**
(0.210, 0.705)
CHAI++ -0.104
(-0.538, 0.331)
-0.156
(-0.356, 0.042)
-0.264*
(-0.511, -0.017)
-0.105
(-0.368, 0.159)
-0.190
(-0.761, 0.382)
0.015
(-0.335, 0.365)
PEPFAR+++ 0.007
(-0.228, 0.242)
-0.089*
(-0.194, -0.015)
-0.132
(-0.491, 0.228)
-0.048
(-0.374, 0.278)
0.015
(-0.325, 0.354)
-0.069
(-0.227, 0.089)
R-square 0.338 0.390 0.305 0.560 0.396 0.183
Observations 1514 1519 1244 1638 619 771
Linear regression models whether the dependent variable is the logarithm of price. The reference categories are: HIV Prevalence <2%; Low income 
countries; Volume 1st tercile
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; Robust 95% confidence intervals in parentheses ***API = AIDS Program Effort Index; +Abbreviation of the 
ARV drugs: EFV = efavirenz; ZDV = zidovudine; 3TC = lamivudine; NVP = nevirapine; d4T = stadivudine; ++CHAI = Clinton Foundation HIV/AIDS 
initiative; +++PEPFAR = President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief.
Data source: Global Price Reporting Mechanism 2005 to 2008BMC Public Health 2009, 9(Suppl 1):S6 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/S1/S6
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Table 2: Factors associated with second-line ARV prices
Antiretroviral drugs+ ABC
300 mg
ddI
100 mg
ddI
400 mg
LPV/r
133/33 mg
RTV
100 mg
TDV
300 mg
HIV Prevalence 2-5% -0.060
(-0.181, 0.061)
-0.109
(-0.298, 0.080)
-0.509**
(-0.663, -0.354)
-0.405*
(-0.785, -0.024)
-0.107
(-0.453, -0.239)
-0.126*
(-0.222, -0.031)
HIV Prevalence >5% -0.092
(-0.247, 0.063)
-0.167
(-0.335, -0.002)
-0.343**
(-0.417, -0.269)
-0.629*
(-1.015, -0.244)
-0.382
(-1.041, 0.277)
-0.137*
(-0.265, 0.010)
Lower-middle-income -0.018
(-0.155, 0.118)
0.227
(-0.417, 0.871)
0.573
(0.199, 0.948)
0.657
(0.033, 1.282)*
-0.050
(-0.328, 0.428)
0.165
(-0.006, 0.337)
Upper-middle-income -0.040
(-0.278, 0.198)
0.407
(0.129, 0.684)*
0.369
(0.063, 0.676)*
0.284
(-0.373, 0.942)
-0.049
(-0.313, 0.410)
0.272*
(0.076, 0.467)
Volume 2nd tercile -0.006
(-0.123, 0.111)
0.010
(-0.165, 0.185)
0.146
(-0.096, 0.388)
-0.039
(-0.336, 0.257)
0.017
(0.536, 0.501)
-0.117
(-0.256, 0.022)
Volume 3th tercile -0.003
(-0.109, 0.103)
0.023
(-0.190, 0.235)
0.118
(-0.273, 0.509)
-0.410*
(-0.637, -0.182)
-0.405*
(-0.785, -0.025)
-0.158
(-0.329, 0.012)
API*** -0.004
(-0.007, 0.002)
0.008
(-0.011, 0.026)
-0.012
(-0.027, -0.004)
-0.006
(-0.018, 0.006)
0.007
(-0.013, 0.027)
0.001
(0.002, 0.004)
Innovator 0.662**
(0.451, 0.873)
0.571**
(0.411, 0.730)
0.148*
(0.051, 0.245)
-0.714**
(-0.989, -0.438)
-0.793
(-1.789, 0.204)
0.274**
(-0.138, 0.410)
CHAI++ -0.143*
(-0.274, -0.012)
-0.499
(-1.099, 0.102)
-0.550*
(-0.982, -0.117)
-0.279*
(-0.499, 0.060)
-0.666**
(-1.098, -0.235)
-0.193
(-0.582, 0.197)
PEPFAR+++ 0.054
(-0.049, 0.157)
0.046
(-0.265, 0.358)
0.347
(0.092, 0.785)
0.486*
(0.091, 0.880)
-0.118*
(-0.233, 0.002)
0.084
(-0.040, 0.209)
R-square 0.578 0.455 0.481 0.269 0.221 0.408
Observations 793 492 397 484 309 489
Linear regression models whether the dependent variable is the logarithm of price. The reference categories are: HIV Prevalence <2%; Low income 
countries; Volume 1st tercile
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; Robust 95% confidence intervals in parentheses; ***API = AIDS Program Index; +Abbreviation of the ARV 
drugs: ABC = abacavir; ddl = didanosine; LPV/r = lopinavir/ritonavir; RTV = ritonavir; TDV = tenofovir; ++CHAI = Clinton Foundation HIV/AIDS 
initiative; +++PEPFAR = President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
Data source: Global Price Reporting Mechanism 2005 to 2008
Table 3: Factors influencing purchases higher than the lowest and the highest direct manufactured costs
More than lowest direct manufactured costs More than highest direct manufactured costs
Odds ratio p-value Lower
95%CI
Upper
95%CI
Odds ratio p-value Lower
95% CI
Upper
95% CI
HIV prevelence < 2% 11
HIV Prevelence 2-5% 0.75 0.174 0.50 1.13 1.17 0.389 0.81 1.70
HIV Prevalence >5% 0.86 0.300 0.65 1.14 1.36 0.103 0.94 1.97
Low income 11
Lower-middle income 1.43 0.079 0.96 2.14 1.63 0.010 1.13 2.37
Upper-middle income 4.05 0.000 2.23 7.34 2.02 0.003 1.27 3.23
PI* 0.99 0.311 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.480 0.98 1.00
Volume 1sttercile 11
Volume 2ndtercile 0.76 0.211 0.50 1.17 1.28 0.060 0.99 1.65
Volume 3thtercile 0.56 0.016 0.35 0.90 0.69 0.055 0.48 1.01
Innovator 4.01 0.003 1.60 10.45 6.10 0.000 3.09 12.05
CHAI** 0.77 0.255 0.49 1.20 0.53 0.001 0.36 0.77
PEPFAR*** 0.88 0.482 0.61 1.26 1.27 0.143 0.92 1.75
Pseudo R2 0.0994 0.1752
Number of obs 9161 9161
*API = AIDS Program Effort Index; **CHAI = Clinton Foundation HIV/AIDS Initiative; ***PEPFAR = President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief.
Data source: Global Price Reporting Mechanism 2005 to 2008BMC Public Health 2009, 9(Suppl 1):S6 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/S1/S6
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that PEPFAR priority countries were in the majority of
cases not associated with the ARV price; only in the cases
of didanosine 400 mg and lopinavir/ritonavir PEPFAR
focus countries were paying more and the case of lamivu-
dine/zidovudine they were paying less. Although statisti-
cally significant for two first-line ARVs, the API was not
strongly influencing prices.
Characteristics of countries paying more than minimal and 
maximum marginal costs for ARVs
Paying more than the LDMC and HDMC per patient per
year was very strongly associated with innovator product
(Table 3). Countries defined as "lower-middle-income"
and "upper-middle-income" were identified as paying sig-
nificantly more for ARVs than "low-income countries".
Paying less than the HDMC per patient per year was asso-
ciated with being member of CHAI and paying less than
the LDMC per patient per year was associated with procur-
ing very high volumes. No association was found between
being a PEPFAR focus country.
Discussion
The results of the present study, together with findings
from the literature, help to identify factors that influence
prices and to make some recommendations of how pro-
curement processes and policies could contribute to
achieve better value for money.
Generic products are very important to bring prices down
In our models, whether a country purchases an innovator
product or a generic product is the strongest predictor of
price. Generic prices were found to be generally lower
than innovator prices, which means that, despite tiered
pricing patented medications, prices have not yet caught
up with the lower prices offered by generic manufacturers.
As there are exceptions, a recommendation to always rely
on generic products would not be beneficial. For example,
the innovator product of lopinavir/ritonavir was associ-
ated with lower prices than the generic products. Coun-
tries that, due to patent law, are obligated to procure
innovator products, are in a very difficult position because
they have no option other than to negotiate with a
monopoly provider for lower prices. Finding mechanisms
to increase the negotiating power of the purchasing coun-
try may help. However, it is important to note that not all
approaches to strengthen the bargaining position of pur-
chasers have been successful. For example, data from the
Andean region suggests that negotiating as a block of
countries does not necessarily result in lower prices for
individual countries [16].
Country income-level
Country income-level had an important impact on the
ability of a country to obtain prices lower than the LDMC
or HDMC. Only in exceptional cases did countries with a
higher income pay lower prices. This result is consistent
with the expected result in a non-competitive market,
where the manufacturers are able to sell at a price level
that corresponds with the country's willingness and abil-
ity to pay. In this context, it seems important to mention
that many lower- and upper-middle-income countries pay
a significant proportion or all costs for ARVs compared to
low-income countries often relying on donor funds.
Procurement methods
One procurement method to influence prices is bulk pro-
curement. Contrary to the common assumption that large
volume procurement by countries results in lower prices,
the results of the present study indicate that volume is in
very few cases associated with lower prices which is in line
with recent findings from other authors [17]. However,
we found that procurement of very high volume was asso-
ciated with obtaining less than the LDMC per patient per
year. Some authors have found that small volumes are
sometimes used to introduce a product to the country at a
special low price [10]. Interestingly, on the one hand, vol-
ume gives countries more power to negotiate; on the other
hand, the higher volume means that there are more peo-
ple who will demand treatment and the countries are fac-
ing political pressure to respond to this need, which could
reduce their negotiation power.
Another procurement method to lower prices in theory is
third-party negotiation, which is used by CHAI. In our
analysis, CHAI was associated with paying less than the
HDMC. However, when analyzing each ARV separately,
being a member of CHAI was only associated with a lower
price for some ARVs. More analysis is needed to determine
which countries would benefit from being a member of
CHAI and how the strategies used by CHAI could be opti-
mized to achieve further price reductions.
Donor policies
In terms of the effect of large donors on ARV prices, being
a PEPFAR focus country did not result in a lower price for
all except one of the ARVs studied. It has been argued that
higher prices for PEPAR countries do not necessarily mean
less value for money [18]. In this study, quality was not
taken into account. The ARVs that are procured by PEP-
FAR need to be registered with the FDA, which means that
the program may choose a higher priced product over a
lower-priced one, in a case in which the latter does not
have a tentative approval process with the FDA [14,18].
However, in its 2008 program report, it is stated that 70%
of the products from the supply chain management sup-
port of PEPFAR have the lowest international listed price
(Office of the United States Global AIDS Coordinator,
2008). Interestingly, the report mentions two obstacles
that make it difficult to increase the use of generics despite
the objective of PEPFAR to do so: (a) the slow approvalBMC Public Health 2009, 9(Suppl 1):S6 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/S1/S6
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process of generics in some countries and (b) the quality
concern of some buyers. It is worthwhile to investigate
how many countries these barriers apply to and potential
strategies to overcome them.
Another donor policy worth discussing here is the Global
Fund and CHAI requirements for countries to report their
pricing data. In the past decade, medicine procurement
prices have been an area "that has been plagued by a trou-
bling lack of transparency" [19]. However, this require-
ment of price reporting has resulted in an unprecedented
accumulation of procurement price information at the
global level. There has been some controversy whether
increasing the transparency of prices would result in lower
prices for countries. The key argument against it is that it
would undermine the prices charged in higher-income
countries, since the higher-income countries would
demand the prices of low-income countries [6,20]. Even
though it is not possible to determine how ARVs would
have developed without the GPRM, the creation of the
global database and the unprecedented global effort to
increase price transparency nevertheless provides an
important tool for more efficient procurement thorough
benchmarking.
However, there is room for improvement: first, the GPRM
data base is more comprehensive for low- and lower-mid-
dle-income than upper-middle-income and high-income
countries, resulting in a lack of publicly available, system-
atically gathered information about prices for these latter
countries. Particularly, upper-middle-income countries
are in a double disadvantage: 1) limited price information
on a global level and 2) many manufacturers do not
include upper-middle-income countries in their tiered
pricing system. As a result, upper-middle-income coun-
tries must negotiate individually, thus in some cases lim-
iting their country's ability to achieve lower prices.
Second, more analysis is required on how the data is cur-
rently used by staff involved in procurement decisions
and how it can be optimized to support procurement effi-
ciency.
Limitations
The GPRM data mainly include donor-funded procure-
ment transactions from low-income and lower-middle-
income countries, so it may not be representative of the
total procurement of ARVs worldwide and results may not
be generalized to all countries. Although staff of donor
organizations sending the transaction data and those
receiving them at WHO routinely review the reported
information for entry mistakes, we checked all entries
before analysis according to the procedure described
above. However, we did not interview country procure-
ment offices to verify the information reported to the
donor organizations, which means that it was not possi-
ble to correct all potential errors. Taxes, tariffs and inter-
national commercial terms (INCOTERMS) are not
consistently reported, so we did not include them in the
analysis. Based on the US Government Accounting Office
(GAO) and Management Sciences for Health (MSH), the
WHO has reported that taxes, tariffs and INCOTERMS are
between 3% and 15% [4]. Due to these weaknesses of the
data, our results need to be interpreted in the light of the
limitations of the database. As improved procurement
data will be available in the near future, more analysis
needs to be done to confirm our results.
This analysis did not consider pediatric formulations,
only adult formulations. Other authors have analyzed the
need to scale up production and increase distribution of
ARV formulations that are suitable for children [21]. It is
important to mention that some of the factors in our
regression models are confounding; for instance, PEPFAR
focus countries are mainly low-income countries. Our
models do not explain most of the observed variance in
the data. This suggests that a substantial part of the varia-
tion is due to factors which are not included, indicating
that price determinants may be much more complex than
our model suggests.
Other factors much more difficult to measure, such as cor-
ruption or the countries' willingness and capacity to nego-
tiate with monopoly providers, could explain some
differences. We used the API to account for some of these
country-specific characteristics.
Recommendations
The results presented allow identifying options of pro-
curement processes and policies that should be consid-
ered when implementing or reforming access to ARV
programs:
1. Using existing pricing data for benchmarking to
improve procurement efficiency.
2. Moving away from only relying on larger volume to
lower prices. It has been shown that bulk procurement
alone is insufficient to lower prices.
3. Conducting more empirical analysis to identify
strategies which optimize third party negotiation, par-
ticularly for CHAI.
4. PEPFAR focus countries do not have an advantage
or a disadvantage over other countries to obtain lower
prices. More research should focus on how to over-
come quality concerns of buyers and slow registration
processes of generic ARVs in affected countries as iden-BMC Public Health 2009, 9(Suppl 1):S6 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/S1/S6
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tified by PEPFAR as one of the main obstacles for the
use of generics.
5. Identifying which other procurement methods
result in more value for money in the future; for
instance, whether strengthening negotiation skills for
countries would result in lower prices.
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